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1 Introduction
Underground activities are unequally distributed across sectors within an
economy. While analyzing comprehensive survey data for Denmark, Smith
and Pedersen (1998) find that around 70 percent of the total hours performed
in the informal sector is carried out within the service sector or construction
sector. Hence, on a large scale, diﬀerent goods are produced in the informal
and in the formal sector. Although there may be diﬀerent explanations for
why this is the case, one reason may simply be that some types of activities
and goods are easier to hide than others, and hence these goods are more
likely to be produced in the informal sector. For example, cleaning jobs in
private homes, gardening services, hairdressing, home repair activities, and
other types of service jobs.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the macro economic eﬀects of tax
and punishment policies when diﬀerent goods are being produced in the for-
mal and the informal sector. In particular, we focus on how a revenue neutral
change in the government controls of the informal sector aﬀects labour mar-
ket performance. Hence, if the government were to control the underground
economy more severely, either through higher punishment fees or through a
more frequent auditing of informal sector workers and/or firms, what would
then happen to unemployment, sector allocation, and wages? For example,
would higher punishment fees or a higher audit rate lead to a smaller informal
sector? Furthermore, what happens to the number of unemployed workers?
In order to answer these questions, we develop a two-sector general equi-
librium model featuring matching frictions and worker-firm wage bargains.
The two sectors corresponds to the formal sector and the informal sector.
Diﬀerent goods are produced in the two sectors, and workers face job oppor-
tunities in both the formal sector and the informal sector.
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We find that increased government control of the informal sector in terms
of higher punishment fees (i) increases the size of the formal sector and reduce
the size of the informal sector (ii) reduces real producer wages in both sectors,
and (iii) reduces unemployment. Considering the impact of a higher audit
rate is less clear cut. A higher audit rate has an ambiguous impact on
unemployment and real producer wages, and may actually increase the size
of the underground economy.
The principal contribution of the analysis in this paper is that we incor-
porate an imperfectly competitive labour market. This facilitates an analysis
of how tax and punishment policies aﬀect wage setting and unemployment.
Previous research is mainly conducted within the public finance tradition.1
In this literature wages are either assumed to be fixed or determined by
market clearing, and by definition, such framework is unable to examine how
involuntary unemployment is aﬀected by tax and punishment policies. There
have, however, been some recent studies of underground activity in models
of involuntary unemployment; see Kolm and Larsen (2001, 2003), Cavalcanti
(2002), Boeri and Garibaldi (2002) and Fugazza and Jacques (2003). The fo-
cus and modeling strategies are, however, very diﬀerent in these papers. The
studies by Kolm and Larsen (2001) and Fugazza and Jacques (2003) explores
the consequences for unemployment when workers have moral considerations
when deciding on informal sector work. With workers being heterogenous
with respect to moral, only workers with low moral are willing to work in the
informal sector. Kolm and Larsen (2003), has a diﬀerent focus as it examines
the potential for multiple equilibria when there are moral considerations and
a social norm against tax evasion. The study by Cavalcanti (2002) also has
a diﬀerent focus as it explores how labour market policies aﬀects unemploy-
1See Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2000) and Schneider and Eneste (2000) for two recent
surveys of tax avoidence and tax evasion.
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ment in a model with informal labour market opportunities. Firms in the
informal sector diﬀers from firms in the formal sector as they are assumed
to face smaller job creation costs. The study by Boeri and Garibaldi (2002),
considers control policies in a model of informal employment and involun-
tary unemployment. The modelling of the underground activity is, however,
very diﬀerent from the modelling in this paper. In their model, all jobs are
started as legal jobs. Informal jobs come about as legal firms are hit by a
bad productivity shock and face the option of becoming illegal.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and
the equilibrium variables are derived. In section 3, we examine how the
equilibrium variables (tightness, relative prices, real producer wages, sector
allocation, and unemployment) are aﬀected by a fully financed change in the
punishment fees and the audit rate. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model2
The economy consists of two sectors, a formal sector and an informal sector.
Diﬀerent goods are produced in the two sectors. This captures the notion
that certain types of goods and services are more likely to be produced in
the informal sector than other types. For example, cleaning jobs in private
homes, gardening services, hairdressing and other types of service jobs are
more likely to be produced in the informal sector, whereas cars, televisions,
radios etc. are less likely to be produced in the informal sector.3
2This model is along the line of Pissarides 2000, extended to a two sector version.
3If diﬀerent goods are being produced, one could ask ’how come the workers and con-
sumers are able to locate the informal firms whereas the tax authorities are not fully
able to?’ One answer is that the tax authorities cannot oﬃcially search in the same way
as workers, and would need to use searching methods corresponding to each individual
consumer. This is a time-consuming and expensive process, whereby only a fraction p of
all informal firms and workers is detected. The tax authorities know what kind of firms
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The government audits the economy. With probability p a worker-firm
pair in the underground economy is detected and then has to pay a punish-
ment fee and the match will be dissolved.4
2.1 Matching
Workers search for jobs in both the formal and the informal sector. We
assume that only unemployed workers search for jobs. This is a simplification,
i.e. we do not acknowledge that the connection to the labour market given
by working in the formal sector, brings about job opportunities not available
while unemployed. Workers accept job oﬀers as long as the expected payoﬀ
exceeds their reservation wage.5 We assume undirected search as in, for
example, Albrecht and Vroman (2002). The matching function is given by:
X = v1−ηuη,
where u is unemployment and v is the total number of vacancies supplied
by firms. The labour force is normalized to unity, whereby we interpret u
as the unemployment rate and v as the vacancy rate. The number of vacan-
cies supplied by the formal sector and the informal sector are vj, j = F, I,
and hence v = vF + vI . The worker’s transition rates into the two sectors
to search for, but they do not know where to find them and their employees. The firms
are not registered, they do not exist in any statistics, and oﬃcially their employees are
unemployed.
4One can view the assumption of the match being dissolved in several ways. For
example, once detected there may be a court process. This court process may take a
long time. In case the legal system punishes one of the parties, say the employer, the
employees may simply search for a new job. Alternatively, the match may be dissolved as
the detected parties fear that the tax authority will return to the firm and workers with
probability one if the match is continued.
5We focus on the non-trivial case where it is not optimal to reject job oﬀers from one
sector and wait for a job oﬀer from the other sector in order to have an economy with both
a formal and an informal sector. Moreover, we disregard from moral considerations; see
Kolm and Larsen (2001) for a model where workers are heterogenous in terms of moral.
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can be expressed as λF = βXu = βθ
1−η = βπ (θ) , and λI = (1− β) Xu =
(1− β) θ1−η = (1− β) π (θ) , where β = vFv is the fraction of vacancies sup-
plied in the formal sector and θ = v/u is overall labour market tightness. The
term π (θ) can be interpreted as the probability of a worker getting any job
oﬀer, i.e., λF + λI = π (θ). The transition rates facing firms is equal across
firms and given by q = Xv = θ
−η. Furthermore, we define labour market
tightness for the formal sector as θF = vF/u and labour market tightness for
the informal sector as θI = vI/u where hence θF + θI = θ.
2.2 Workers
Unemployed workers have the opportunity to apply for jobs in both the
formal sector and the informal sector. Let λF and λI be interpreted as the
probabilities per time unit of finding a job in the formal sector and in the
informal sector, respectively. The present discounted value of unemployment,
U , employment in the formal sector, EF , and employment in the informal
sector, EI , are given in the following flow value equations:
rU = R + ξP + λ
F (EF − U) + λI(EI − U), (1)
rEF = R + ξ + w
F (1− t)
P + s(U − E
F ), (2)
rEI = R + ξ + w
I (1− pδ)
P + (s + p) (U −E
I), (3)
where r is the exogenous discount rate, t gives the income tax rate, δ captures
the proportion of the evaded wage a worker has to pay as a punishment fee
if detected withholding the government taxes,6 and p is the audit rate. s
is the exogenous separation rate, R is a lump sum transfer received from
6It is of no importance for the results whether the punishment fee is imposed on evaded
income or evaded taxes. This is not always the case in the previous literature of tax evasion,
where the choice to base the fines of evasion on evaded income or evaded taxes may be of
6
the government, and ξ is profits received as dividends. Aggregate profits
generated in the economy is distributed equally across the population.
The match is dissolved when detected which implies that the separation
rate in the informal sector exceeds the formal sector separation rate.
The immediate income received in each state is expressed in real terms by
division with the general price level, P . P is the cost-of-living index which
is linear homogenous in the two goods prices, PF and P I , and derived from
consumer preferences. This expression for real income could equivalently
be interpreted as the instantaneous indirect utility function under certain
conditions. In section 2.7 we discuss preferences in more detail.
The goods prices, and hence the general price level, is in equilibrium
determined by market clearing and is taken as given by the individual firms
and workers. It is hence of no importance for the results whether the flow
value equations given in this section, and the next section, are given in terms
of real income or in nominal income.
2.3 Firms
The marginal productivity of a worker is y.7 Hiring costs are denoted kj , j =
F, I and q is the firm’s probability per time unit of finding a worker. Since
the value functions for workers are expressed in real terms, we express the
value functions for firms also in real terms.
Firms in the formal sector are characterized by the arbitrage equations:
rJF = P
F
P y −
wF (1 + z)
P + s(V
F − JF ), (4)
rV F = q(JF − V F )− k
F
P , (5)
significant importance for the results. See Yitzhaki (1974) who pointed out the importance
of this critical assumption.
7There is no apriori reason to assume that one of the productivities should be greater
than the other.
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where JF is the value of having a filled job in the formal sector, V F is the
value of an unfilled job in this sector, and the parameter z is the payroll tax
rate.
Similarly, firms in the informal sector have JI and V I determined by:
rJI = P
I
P y −
wI (1 + pα)
P + (s+ p) (V
I − JI), (6)
rV I = q(JI − V I)− k
I
P , (7)
where α is the proportion of the evaded wage the firm has to pay as a pun-
ishment fee for cheating the government on payroll taxes when supplying
informal sector jobs.
2.4 Wages
In the wage bargains, the firm and the worker take the market clearing prices
as given. Wages, wj , j = F, I solve first order conditions from the Nash
Bargaining Solutions with the worker’s bargaining power being equal to γ:
γ
1− γ
1
φj
¡
J j − V j
¢
= Ej − U, j = F, I, (8)
where φF = 1+z
1−t and φ
I = 1+pα
1−pδ are the tax and punishment wedges.
By use of equations (1)-(7) in equations (8), and assuming free entry,
V j = 0, j = F, I, and symmetric conditions facing firms and workers within
each sector, the relevant real producer wages are:
ωF = w
F (1 + z)
PF = γy
µ
1 + ρ
µ
θF + θ
I
∆
¶¶
, (9)
ωI = w
I (1 + pα)
P I = γy
µ
1 + ρ∆
µ
θF + θ
I
∆
¶¶
, (10)
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where
∆ = ψP
F
P I , (11)
and
ψ = φ
I
φF
=
1 + pα
1− pδ /
1 + z
1− t , (12)
where we have used that kj = ρP jy, j = F, I . One interpretation of this
specification of the vacancy cost is that the firm allocates its work force
optimally between production and recruitment activities. The cost of hiring
is proportional to its alternative cost, i.e., proportional to the value of the
marginal product of labour. ψ is the punishment/tax wedge between the
informal sector and the formal sector. We will simply refer to ψ as the
wedge. It seems reasonable to focus on the case when ψ < 1, that is, when
the government does not audit or punish the informal sector to the same
extent as the formal sector is taxed. This is, however, of no importance for
the results.
The wage rules in (9) and (10) capture the wage demands, i.e., the bar-
gained wages for a given relative price and for given tightness. The relative
price and sector tightness are clearly endogenous variables and will be de-
termined in equilibrium. However, before proceeding to the determination
of equilibrium, we can explore the consequences of a change in the tax and
punishment rates, α, δ, z, and t, and the audit rate, p, on wage demands.
For given equilibrium variables, an increase in the punishment rates or the
audit rate for given tax rates, will reduce the formal sector wage demands,
and increase the wage demands in the informal sector. The reason is that the
value of employment has fallen in the informal sector relative to in the formal
sector. Workers employed in the informal sector hence face a reduced value of
employment relative to unemployment and will push for higher wages. The
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opposite holds for workers employed in the formal sector, which causes formal
sector workers to moderate their wage demands. Analogous interpretation
can be given for changes in the tax rates for a given punishment policy.
It also follows from (9) and (10) that proportional changes in the tax and
punishment system, leaving the wedge unaﬀected, will have no impact on
wage demands since these changes have no eﬀect on the value of employment
relative to the value of unemployment in each respective sector.
2.5 Labour market tightness
Labour market tightness for the formal and the informal sector is determined
by equations (4),(5), (6) and (7) using the free entry condition and the wage
equations (9) and (10) :
(r + s) θη = (1− γ)ρ − γ
µ
θF + θ
I
∆
¶
, (13)
(r + s+ p) θη = (1− γ)ρ − γ
¡
∆θF + θI
¢
. (14)
Note, however, that equations (13) and (14) determine labour market tight-
ness in the formal sector and the informal sector conditioned on the relative
price, i.e., ∆ = ψPFP I . Thus we have two equations in the three unknowns,
labour market tightness in the two sectors and the relative price, θF , θI , and
PF
P I .
To close the system, we need to incorporate the product market. Before
doing that it turns out to be useful to derive the employment rates.
2.6 Employment
Steady state employment and unemployment rates are derived by considering
the flows into and out of employment and the labour force identity, nF +
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nI + u = 1. The flow equations are given by λFu = snF (formal sector) and
λIu = (s+ p)nI (informal sector).
Solving for the employment rates and the unemployment rate, we obtain:
nI =
θIθ−η
s+p
1 + θ
F θ−η
s +
θIθ−η
s+p
, (15)
nF =
θF θ−η
s
1 + θ
F θ−η
s +
θIθ−η
s+p
, (16)
u = 1
1 + θ
F θ−η
s +
θIθ−η
s+p
, (17)
uo = u+ nI =
1 + θ
Iθ−η
s+p
1 + θ
F θ−η
s +
θIθ−η
s+p
, (18)
where uo denotes oﬃcial unemployment, that is, unemployment registered
by the government. The relative sector size of employment is given by:
nF
nI =
θF
θI
s+ p
s . (19)
2.7 Product market equilibrium
Product markets clear in each period. We assume that individual preferences
over the two goods are represented by a linear homogenous instantaneous
utility function υ
¡
CFi , CIi
¢
, where CF is produced in the formal sector and
CI is produced in the informal sector.8 Individuals choose the optimal mix
of the two goods in each period by maximizing utility given their budget
constraint. With a linear homogenous utility function, individual demand
for each good is linear in the available income. Moreover, the indirect utility
function is linear in income; i.e., υ
¡
Ii, P F , P I
¢∗
= Ii/P
¡
P F , P I
¢
where Ii is
the individual’s available income from the budget constraint, and P
¡
P F , P I
¢
8UF , UI > 0, and UFF , UII < 0.
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is the cost-of-living index. Note that the instantaneous real income measure
used in the flow value equations (1)-(3) can also be interpreted as the instan-
taneous utility given workers are risk neutral and consume their full income
in each period.
Let us now consider market clearing. Aggregating over individual demand
in order to derive aggregate demand for the two goods is simply a matter of
aggregating over individual income, as preferences are homothetic. Hence,
we have that the aggregate demand for the two goods is given from the first-
order condition for the individual consumer’s optimal mix of commodities,
i.e.
υF (CF ,CI)
υI (CF ,CI) = P
F/P I , in conjunction with the aggregate (economy wide)
budget constraint. The relative price is obtained by equating demand and
supply of commodities. The aggregate supplies of the two goods are given
by production deducted vacancy costs. In the formal sector, we have Y F =
ynF − vFρy = nFy (1− ρθηs) . Similarly, in the informal sector, aggregate
supply is Y I = ynI − vIρy = nIy (1− ρθη (s+ p)) .
Equalizing aggregate demand and aggregate supply leads to the following
equation:
υF
¡
Y F/Y I , 1
¢
υI (Y F/Y I , 1)
=
PF
P I . (20)
For simplicity, we assume a Cobb Douglas Utility function U =
¡
CF
¢σ ¡CI¢1−σ.
Using the Cobb Douglas assumption together with equation (19), we can
rewrite equation (20) as:
σ
1− σ
θI
θF
³
1
s+p − ρθ
η
´
¡
1
s − ρθ
η¢ = PFP I , (21)
which is an equation in the three unknowns θF , θI , and PFP I .
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2.8 Equilibrium
Now we can characterize the equilibrium in the labour and goods markets
with the equations (13), (14), and (21). We have:
(r + s)
¡
θF + θI
¢η
=
(1− γ)
ρ − γ
µ
θF + θ
I
∆
¶
, (22)
(r + s+ p)
¡
θF + θI
¢η
=
(1− γ)
ρ − γ∆
µ
θF + θ
I
∆
¶
, (23)
ψ σ
1− σ
θI
θF
1
s+p − ρθ
η
1
s − ρθ
η = ∆, (24)
where we recall that ∆ = ψPFP I . Firms will enter into the two sectors as
long as the expected vacancy costs are equal to the discounted profit. This is
captured by equations (22) and (23). Equation (24) gives the relative price
as a function of the relative supply derived from consumer preferences.
Because the separation rate for informal sector jobs is higher than the
separation rate for formal sector jobs, it is more attractive for a firm to
enter the formal sector since jobs on the average last a longer time in the
formal sector. On the other hand if ψ < 1, firms in the informal sector are
expected to be punished less than firms in the formal sector are taxed, which
makes it more attractive to enter the informal sector. However, whether it
is more attractive to enter one or the other sector also depends on the prices
consumers pay for the diﬀerent goods produced. Or put diﬀerently, entry into
one sector rather than the other sector because of the relative attractiveness
of the tax/punishment system or the diﬀerence in the separation rates will
be counteracted by adjustments in the relative price. Entry into the formal
sector will increase the supply of formal goods and hence reduce the relative
price PF/P I , which in turn reduces the relative attractiveness of entering
the formal sector.
We only consider fully financed reforms. Hence, the government budget
13
restriction is always satisfied and is given by:
nFωF
µ
1− 1
φF
¶
+ nIωI ψ∆(1−
1
φI
)− c
¡
p, nI , nF
¢
=
R
P F , (25)
where c
¡
p, nF , nI
¢
is a function that captures that there is a cost associated
with auditing.9 The budget restriction is a function of the tax and punish-
ment wedges, φF and φI , and the audit rate, p. Recall that the producer
wages, employment rates, and ∆ are functions of the wedge, ψ = φIφF , and
the audit rate p, where we note that p appears both in the wedge ψ and
in the informal sector separation rate, s + p. The tax rates, t and z, and
the punishment rates, δ and α, will not appear in the government budget
restriction directly when all substitutions are done. This reflects that t and
z are equivalent instruments, and so are δ and α. Hence it does not matter
if we tax (punish) the firm side or the worker side. A change in δ and α is
captured by a change in φI, and a change in z and t is captured by a change
in φF .
From (25) it is clear that an increase in φF and φI that leaves ψ and p
unaﬀected, will increase the government revenue. Hence for a given wedge,
the government can choose t, z, δ and α so as to reap any level of revenue.
This is very convenient and implies that we can investigate the impact of
various reforms on the equilibrium variables, without explicitly incorporating
the government budget restriction.
9In the literature on tax evasion it is commonly assumed that auditing is costly whereas
punishment fees are costless. The auditing costs may depend on p and the number of
producing firms in each sector. As will become clear below, any specification of the
auditing costs that includes any of the real variables in the model or the auditing rate, p,
or the wedge, ψ, will yield the same results.
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3 Comparative statics
This section considers the impact of two reforms on tightness, relative prices,
real producer wages, sector allocation and unemployment. The first reform
involves a change in the punishment rates, α and/or δ, whereas the second
reform involves a change in the audit rate p. Both reforms are fully financed
and will be discussed in turn below.
Before considering the reforms we will engage in some substitution in
order to reduce the equation system in (22)-(24) and to trace down some
intuition. First, we eliminate
³
θF + θI∆
´
from (22) and (23) above. This
yields
∆ =
(1−γ)
ρ − (r + s+ p) θ
η
(1−γ)
ρ − (r + s) θ
η
> 0
< 1
, (26)
where ∆ = ψPFP I . Hence, the free entry conditions determine the relative
price, P
F
P I , conditional on total tightness θ. Changes in ψ will induce propor-
tional adjustments in the relative price so that ∆ is unaﬀected.
Equation (26) reflects the discussion in connection with equations (22)-
(24), and verifies that it is ψ and the diﬀerence in the separation rates that
are important for the entry and exit into the two sectors, and hence for the
relative price. This is easily seen by considering the following two imaginary
polar cases. If ψ < 1, and p = 0, we have ∆ = 1 and hence PFP I =
1
ψ > 1.
That is, the informal sector is more attractive in the sense that informal
firms are expected to be punished less than formal firms are taxed. Hence,
firms keep entering the informal sector until the formal sector relative price
has increased to such an extent that formal firms are fully compensated for
the fact that ψ < 1. If on the other hand ψ = 1, and p > 0, we have that
PF
P I = ∆ < 1. That is, the formal sector is more attractive in the sense that
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jobs on average last a longer time, and the entry of firms into the formal
sector will reduce the relative price on formal goods below unity. However,
with ψ < 1, and p > 0, we have PFP I =
∆
ψ which can be either smaller or
larger than unity reflecting the two counteracting incentives determining the
relative attractiveness of the two sectors.
Moreover, we have that
∂∆
∂θ = −
ηθη−1 (1− γ) p
ρ
³
(1−γ)
ρ − (r + s)
¡
θF + θI
¢η´2 < 0. (27)
That is, the relative price P
F
P I falls with an increase in total tightness for a
given ψ and for given separation rates. We know that p > 0 implies that
the informal sector is relatively less attractive, since jobs last on average a
shorter time in the informal sector. However, when θ is low, it is quite easy
to fill a vacancy. The fact that jobs separate easier in the informal sector
is hence not as important since, in case of separation, the open vacancy can
quickly be filled again. A large θ will, for the same reasons, increase the
importance of a long job duration. An increase in total tightness will reduce
the attractiveness of the informal sector for given separation rates and ψ,
which induces a reallocation of workers towards the formal sector with a
reduction in the formal sector relative price, P
F
P I , as a consequence.
By substituting the expression for ∆ given by equation (26) into (22), we
get
(r + s) θη = (1− γ)ρ − γ

θF + θI
Ã
(1−γ)
ρ − (r + s+ p) θ
η
(1−γ)
ρ − (r + s) θ
η
!−1
 , (28)
where θ = θF+θI , which is one equation in the two unknowns θF , and θI .We
hence have a relationship between sector tightness, and most convenient this
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relationship is independent of the relative punishment rate, ψ. The relative
price will adjust so to make this relationship independent of ψ. It will,
however, depend on p. Diﬀerentiating (28) with respect to sector tightness
and we have
∂θF
∂θI
= −
(r + s) ηθη−1 + γ∆
³
1− θI∆
∂∆
∂θ
´
(r + s) ηθη−1 + γ∆
³
∆− θI∆
∂∆
∂θ
´ < −1 (29)
where ∆ < 1. From (29), we have that informal tightness crowds out formal
tightness, and vice versa. Moreover, a one unit increase in informal tightness
will reduce formal tightness by more than one unit. This is a consequence
of ∆ being smaller than unity. Recall from (26) that ∆ < 1 follows because
p > 0 prevents firms from entering the informal sector to some extent, and
hence induces the relative price, P
F
P I , to be lower than elsewise would have
been the case. This price premium in the informal sector makes this sector
relatively more attractive in the sense that informal firms face lower real
producer wages, and workers in the informal sector face higher real consumer
wages.10
To illustrate the intuition behind this sectorial trade-oﬀ, consider the
following example: An exogenous reduction in informal sector tightness. This
will induce wage moderation in the whole economy as the value attached
to unemployment falls; the fall in informal tightness is dampened whereas
formal tightness increases. This explains the negative sign in (29). The
increase in formal sector tightness will, however, induce a wage push in the
economy. The wage push following the increase in formal sector tightness
will never dominate the wage moderation following the reduction in informal
tightness. The reason is that the employment probability increases in the
sector where the pay-oﬀ is the lowest (the formal sector) and falls in the
10>From (9) and (10) we have ωF > ωI , and wF (1− t) > wI (1− pδ).
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sector where the pay-oﬀ is the highest (informal sector). That is, as workers,
in the event of unemployment, now face an increased probability of finding
themselves employed in the lower paying sector, the wage moderating eﬀect
will dominate. This implies that tightness in the formal sector increases by
more than informal tightness falls.11
A shorter way of expressing why the wage response following a change
in informal tightness is stronger than the wage response following an equally
sized change in formal tightness is to say that the informal sector is given a
larger weight in the wage bargains than is the formal sector. As the pay-oﬀ
in the informal sector is higher, it follows that changes in job opportunities
in this sector are also relatively more important for the wage bargains.
3.1 Changes in the punishment fee
This section is concerned with the impact on tightness, relative prices, real
producer wages, sector allocation, and unemployment of a fully financed
change in the punishment fee given by a change in α and/or δ. Tax rates
z and/or t are adjusting so to keep the government budget in (25) balanced
at all times. The audit rate p is taken as given throughout this reform. As
is clear from (22)-(24), (15)-(17), (9) and (10), the equilibrium variables will
only be aﬀected by changes in α, δ, z, and t through the wedge, ψ. Hence,
we can conduct comparative statics with respect to ψ without explicitly
having to account for the government budget restriction since any government
revenue can be reaped by appropriate changes in α, δ, z, and t at any given
wedge.
11One may however argue that the informal sector is less attractive because the sectoral
separation rate is higher in itself. However, the fact that the separation rate is higher in
the informal sector has no impact on the wage bargains as it aﬀects the worker and the
firm equally. In addition, the direct eﬀect of having for example, ψ < 1, has no eﬀect on
the wage bargains as this is counteracted by the relative price.
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3.1.1 Labour market tightness and real producer wages
The eﬀects on tightness, real producer wages, and the relative price are sum-
marized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 12A fully financed increase in the punishment fee, δ or α,
will increase tightness in the formal sector, θF , and reduce tightness in the
informal sector, θI. Total tightness, θ, increases and real producer wages in
the two sectors, ωF and ωI, fall. The relative price, PFP I , falls.
All propositions in the paper can be derived from the equilibrium equa-
tions. See the appendix for details.
An increase in ψ will make it relatively worse to be in the underground
economy. Hence the value of employment in the informal sector falls relative
to unemployment which increases informal sector wage demands. In the
formal sector, on the other hand, wage demands fall because the value of
formal employment has increased relative to the value of unemployment.
From the firms’ perspective, these happenings tend to increase the pro-
ducer costs in the informal sector whereas producer costs in the formal sector
tend to fall. Consequently, exit from the informal sector and entry into the
formal sector are initiated. That is, labour market tightness in the formal
sector, θF , increases and labour market tightness in the informal sector, θI ,
falls.13
12For an intuitive interpretation, the propositions are expressed as if an increase in
φI financed by adjustments in φF implies that ψ = φI/φF increases. Other, although
perhaps less plausible cases, are of course also incorporated. The propositions simply
capture fully financed changes in the tax and punishment systems that aﬀect the relative
tax and punishment rates between the formal and informal economy.
13In fact, there is an additional eﬀect reinforcing the reallocation process towards the
formal sector. As a given reduction in θI induces θF to increase by more, total tightness
increases. Thereby vacancy costs increase, which tends to reduce the supply of goods in
both sectors. However, as the separation rate is higher in the informal sector, the fraction
of total sector production that accounts for vacancy costs increases by more in the informal
sector. This tends to further reinforce the reallocation process towards the formal sector.
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The relative price is now aﬀected. The reallocation of jobs towards the
formal sector increases the production of formal sector goods relative to in-
formal sector goods, which reduces the relative price, P
F
P I . The relative price
adjustments will eventually restore the equilibrium since the increase in the
relative price eventually makes it profitable to produce informal goods and
eliminates the profitability of producing formal goods.
Although the direct eﬀect on real producer wages of an increase in ψ is
that informal wages increase and formal wages fall, relative price adjustments
fully counteracts these eﬀects in equilibrium. The equilibrium eﬀects on real
producer wages is, in fact, entirely explained by changes in the reallocation
of firms across sectors. Because ∆ < 1, the informal sector is given a larger
weight in the wage bargains than is the formal sector. Hence the wage mod-
eration following a reduction in θI is going to be larger than the wage push
following an equally sized increase in θF . If, for the sake of the argument,
total tightness where unaﬀected by this reallocation, also the time unit prob-
ability of finding any job would be the same, i.e., λF + λI = θ1−η. However,
with total tightness being unaﬀected, the expected pay-oﬀ from finding any
job must have fallen for an unemployed worker as the probability of finding
a better paying job has fallen and the probability of finding lesser good pay-
ing job has increased. Hence the value of unemployment would in this case
be lower, which calls for wage moderation. This wage moderation following
the reallocation of jobs towards the formal sector is the driving force behind
the reduction in the equilibrium real producer wages. Moreover, this wage
moderation explains why total tightness must increase.14
14When total tightness increases it becomes relatively less attractive to enter the infor-
mal sector since the separation rate is higher in the informal sector than in the formal
sector, which further reinforces the reallocation of firms towards the formal sector. This
further reduces the relative price (that is, further reduces the relative price than was in-
duced in order to fully counteract the direct eﬀects on wage demands of a change in ψ).
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3.1.2 Employment
We summarize the results on employment and unemployment in the following
proposition:
Proposition 2 A fully financed increase in the punishment fee, δ or α, will
increase the employment rate in the formal sector, nF , and reduce the em-
ployment rate in the informal sector, nI. Both actual unemployment, u, and
oﬃcial unemployment, uo, falls with the reform.
It comes as no surprise that increased punishment fees relative to tax
rates induce a reallocation of workers from the informal sector towards the
formal sector. An increased wedge increases the transition rate into formal
sector employment, whereas the opposite movements occur in the informal
sector. Actual unemployment falls both because the overall transition rate
into employment, λF + λI = θ1−η, increases and because the transition rate
out of employment is lower in the formal sector. Oﬃcial unemployment falls
as both actual unemployment and informal sector employment fall.
3.2 Changes in the audit rate
This section is concerned with the impact on tightness, the relative price,
real producer wages, sector allocation, and unemployment of a fully financed
change in the audit rate p. The tax rates z and/or t and the punishment
fees α and/or δ are adjusting so as to keep the government budget in (25)
balanced at all times. As is clear from (22)-(24), (15)-(17), (9) and (10),
the equilibrium variables will be aﬀected by changes in p both through the
wedge ψ, and through the informal sector separation rate, s + p. However,
This tends to increase real producer wages in the formal sector and reduce the informal
sector real producer wages. However, this eﬀect can never dominate the eﬀects induced
by the fact that the reallocation brings about stronger wage moderation than wage push;
real producer wages fall in both sectors.
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from the government budget restriction in (25) we know that there is always
an appropriate adjustment in z and/or t and the punishment rates α and/or
δ that will produce any level of government revenues for a given ψ. Hence
to clarify how changes in p aﬀect the equilibrium variables via the informal
sector separation rate, s + p, this reform considers changes in p for a given
ψ.
From the previous analysis we could conclude how changes in ψ aﬀected
the equilibrium variables and it is straight forward to extent the analysis
below to incorporate that ψ is increased by an increase in p. The discussion
in the introduction and in the conclusion summarizes the full eﬀects of an
increase in p.
3.2.1 Labour market tightness and real producer wages
The eﬀect on tightness is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 A fully financed increase in the audit rate, p (for a given ψ),
will decrease total tightness, ∂θ∂p < 0.
We first note that we cannot exclude that informal sector tightness ac-
tually increases with an increased audit rate. An increase in p reduces the
profitability for firms to enter the informal sector by reducing the average
length of a match, which works in the expected direction of reducing informal
sector tightness, θI tends to fall. In addition, however, the relative price, pFpI ,
is directly reduced by an increase in p since the outflow of informal sector
workers increases for given tightness, and hence the production of informal
goods fall. This relative price eﬀect will increase the attractiveness for firms
to enter the informal sector, tending to increase θI .
Since we cannot conclude whether θI falls or increases with p, we can-
not conclude whether θF increases or falls with p. The direct negative eﬀect
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on the relative price tends to reduce formal sector tightness by making the
formal sector less attractive for firms to enter. However, if informal sector
tightness falls, formal sector tightness tends to increase since the value of un-
employment is reduced and hence wages are moderated in the formal sector.
The overall impact on θF is ambiguous.
Total labour market tightness falls with an increase in the audit rate. This
follows because the direct negative eﬀect on the relative price reduces formal
sector tightness. For example, if θI increases with the reform, we know from
(29) that θF falls by more. Hence total tightness falls. The fact that PFP I falls
as a direct eﬀect of a higher p, will further reduce θF and total tightness. If,
on the other hand, θI falls with the reform, formal sector tightness increases
by more, and total tightness tends to increase. However, the fact that the
relative price falls as a direct eﬀect of an increase in p will reduce formal
sector tightness, and hence the fall in θI is larger than the increase in θF ;
total tightness falls.15
In general, it cannot be determined whether the relative price increases
or decreases with an increase in p. Considering for example equation (24), we
can see that the direct eﬀect of an increase in p makes the relative price fall.
There is, however, a counteracting eﬀect working through total tightness.
As total tightness falls with an increase in p, the relative supply of informal
goods falls due to that vacancy costs increases by more in the informal sector.
In addition to that, relative tightness can move in either direction. However,
if informal sector tightness falls, the relative price will fall. Hence, the eﬀect
working through vacancy costs can not dominate the eﬀects working through
p directly and through relative tightness.
15Due to that the relative price, P
F
P I , falls as a direct eﬀect of a higher p may even make
θF fall. But again total tightness falls.
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The eﬀects on real producer wages is given by the following proposition:
Proposition 4 A fully financed increase in the audit rate, p (for a given
ψ), will increase the real producer wage in the formal sector, ∂ωF∂p > 0. The
impact on the informal sector real producer wage is ambiguous.
Firms enter into the two sectors until the expected vacancy costs are
equal to the discounted profits. This implies that the expected time it takes
to fill a vacancy is equal to the discounted profits relative to the per period
vacancy cost. For reasons given above, we know that total tightness falls
with an increase in p although we cannot determine how sector tightness
and the relative prices are aﬀected in general. If total tightness falls with
the reform, and hence a vacancy is expected to be filled at a faster rate,
discounted profits in the two sectors relative to per period vacancy costs has
to fall as well. The reallocation of firms across the two sectors will assure
that. In the formal sector this can only be achieved by an increase in the real
producer wage. In the informal sector, however, an increase in p will reduce
the expected profits since a match is expected to last a shorter number of
periods. It is hence not necessarily the case that the real producer wage in
the informal sector increases as a consequence of a higher p.
3.2.2 Employment
As we cannot exclude that relative tightness, θ
F
θI , actually falls following an
increase in p, we cannot exclude that relative employment, nFnI , falls with
the reform. However, if relative tightness decreases with the reform, relative
employment will fall as well. This follows both because the relative transition
rate into formal employment falls, and because outflow of workers from the
informal sector increases.
The impact on unemployment is, however, ambiguous. It is not possible
to exclude the case that the unemployment rate falls with an increase in
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the audit rate. This is so although we know that total tightness falls, and
hence the total transition rate into employment falls, and that the exit rate
from the informal sector increases.16 The reason is the reallocation eﬀect.
Consider, for example, that this reforms brings about increased inflow into
formal sector employment. This may reduce the unemployment rate although
the transition rate into the informal sector falls by more than the transition
rate into formal sector increases. This follows because the formal sector
separation rate is lower than the informal sector separation rate and hence
for a given increase in the sector transition rate into employment, formal
sector employment has to increase by more than informal sector employment
in order to balance inflows with outflow in steady state. That is, employment
in the formal sector is more sensitive to changes in its transition rate than
are informal sector employment.
4 Conclusion
This paper developed a two-sector general equilibrium matching model with
diﬀerent goods produced in the formal sector and the informal sector. This
enabled an analysis of how increased government control of the underground
economy aﬀects wage formation, sector allocation, and unemployment. This
is something that to a large extent has been ignored in the previous litera-
ture where wages have been taken as either given or determined by market
clearing.
Based on this framework, we have shown that increased government con-
trol of the underground economy in terms of higher punishment fees reduces
the size of the underground economy, reduces real producer wages in the two
sectors, and reduces actual and oﬃcial unemployment.
16Recall that the total transition rate into employment is λF + λI = θ1−η.
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The intuition behind these results is as follows. Increased punishment
fees induce wage demands to increase in the informal sector and fall in the
formal sector. As a consequence, firms find it profitable to exit the informal
sector and enter the formal sector. In turn, this reallocation of production
will reduce the formal sector relative price. The relative price adjustments
will fully counteract the direct eﬀects on real producer wages in equilibrium.
Both real producer wages and unemployment instead fall due to the rather
strong wage moderation that follows this reallocation process.
This strong wage moderation was essential and is here summarized. The
reallocation of firms from the informal sector towards the formal sector will
induce both increased and reduced wage demands. When firms enter the
formal sector, wage demands increase since employment perspectives in the
formal sector increase. Analogously, wage demands fall when firms exit the
informal sector as employment perspectives in this sector fall. The wage mod-
eration following a firm exiting the informal sector is, however, larger than
the wage push following a firm entering the formal sector. The reason why
wages are more responsive to changes in informal tightness is that the pay-oﬀ
in the informal sector exceeds that of the formal sector. Hence, changes in
job opportunities in the informal sector are relatively more important for the
wage bargains as the pay-oﬀ in this sector is higher. This rather strong wage
moderation explains why real producer wages and unemployment fall.
Considering the full eﬀects on labour market performance of an increase
in the audit rate produced less clear results. In addition to the eﬀects pre-
viously described, there was a direct positive eﬀect on the probability of a
worker-firm match being separated. The outflow from informal sector em-
ployment into the unemployment pool hence increased. Furthermore, we
found that the overall transition rate into employment fell caused by an in-
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crease in the informal sector separation rate. These eﬀects tended to increase
unemployment. Consequently, the overall impact of increased auditing on
unemployment is ambiguous.
5 Appendix: Proof of propositions
5.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Diﬀerentiate equation (24) with respect to θI and ψ, taking into account that
∆ is a function of θF and θI as given by (26) and that θF is a function of θI
through equation (28). This yields
dθI
dψ =
θF
θI
∆
ψ
Ã
∆
∂ θFθI
∂θI
+
Ã
θF
θI
∂∆
∂θ + ψ
σ
1− σ
1
s −
1
s+p¡
1
s − ρθ
η¢2ρηθη−1
!µ
∂θF
∂θI
+ 1
¶!−1
where
∂(θF /θI)
∂θI =
³
∂θF
∂θI θ
I − θF
´
/
¡
θI
¢2 < 0, and ∂θF∂θI + 1 < 0 from (29). A
suﬃcient condition for a negative sign is then:
∆
∂ θFθI
∂θI
+
θF
θI
∂∆
∂θ
µ
∂θF
∂θI
+ 1
¶
< 0.
Substituting for
³
∂θF
∂θI + 1
´
and
∂ θ
F
θI
∂θI and simplifying we obtain:
−∆θ
F
θI
¡
(r + s) ηθη−1 + γ
¢
− (r + s) ηθη−1 − γ∆ +
³ γ
∆θ
I + θFγ
´ ∂∆
∂θ < 0.
Thus, ∂θ
I
∂ψ < 0. Thereby
∂θF
∂θI
∂θI
∂ψ > 0 and
∂θ
∂ψ =
³
∂θF
∂θI + 1
´
∂θI
∂ψ > 0. Regard-
ing the relative price we have P
F
P I =
∆
ψ where
∂
³
PF
PI
´
∂ψ =
³
∂∆
∂ψψ −∆
´
/ψ2 < 0
since ∂∆∂ψ =
∂∆
∂θ
∂θ
∂ψ < 0.
Diﬀerentiating equations (9) and (10) with respect to ψ yields:
∂ωF
∂ψ = γρy
µ
∂θF
∂ψ +
∂θI
∂ψ
1
∆ −
θI
∆2
∂∆
∂θ
∂θ
∂ψ
¶
, (30)
∂ωI
∂ψ = γρy
µ
∂θF
∂ψ ∆+ θ
F ∂∆
∂θ
∂θ
∂ψ +
∂θI
∂ψ
¶
. (31)
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From (13) and (14), we have:
θη = (1− γ)
(r + s) ρ − γ
³
θF + θI∆
´
(r + s) , (32)
θη = (1− γ)
(r + s+ p) ρ − γ
∆
³
θF + θI∆
´
(r + s+ p) . (33)
Diﬀerentiation brings out the following expressions
ηθη−1 ∂θ∂ψ = −
γ
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µ
∂θF
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1
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∂θI
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¶
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where we know from the proof of proposition 1 that ∂θ∂ψ > 0. This implies
that ∂θ
F
∂ψ +
∂θI
∂ψ
1
∆ −
θI
∆2
∂∆
∂θ
∂θ
∂ψ < 0 and
∂θF
∂ψ ∆+ θ
F ∂∆
∂θ
∂θ
∂ψ +
∂θI
∂ψ < 0 have to hold.
Hence we have that the equilibrium real producer wages have to fall in both
sectors.
5.2 Proof of Proposition 2.
Diﬀerentiate equation (15) and (16) with respect to ψ gives:
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Furthermore, the unemployment rate is aﬀected in the following way:
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which is satisfied. Considering uo, we have ∂uo∂ψ =
∂u
∂ψ +
∂nI
∂ψ < 0 from this
proof.
5.3 Proof of Proposition 3.
Diﬀerentiating the equilibrium system, equations (22) - (24) give:
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Adding the derivatives for labour market tightness we obtain:
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5.4 Proof of Proposition 4.
Diﬀerentiating equations (9) and (10) with respect to p yields:
∂ωF
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From (13) and (14), we have:
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Diﬀerentiation brings out the following expression
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where we know from the proof of proposition (3) that ∂θ∂p < 0. This implies
that ∂θ
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